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INTRODUCTION

C

hapter 11 has healed itself.' According to some of its leading
critics, chapter 11 is no longer the long, expensive process that it
was in the 1980s,2 when storied companies like Pan Am slowly wasted
away their remaining value in vainglorious attempts to survive in a changed
marketplace.' Today's chapter 11 is a swift, market-driven process that
quickly moves troubled companies into more capable hands.
The credit for chapter I l's cure can be traced to improved markets for
distressed assets, reduced use of firm-specific assets, and experience, but
most of the credit goes to control rights.4 In particular, advances in financial
contracting are said to allow the parties to agree "about who should
exercise control over the firm's assets in any particular state of the world."5
Most often these control rights are exercised by a DIP lender 6 who will take
charge of the debtor upon its financial collapse.' As neatly summarized by
two proponents of the control rights theory: "Corporate reorganizations
'See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (2000).
2 See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55

STAN.L. REV. 751, 758-59 (2002) (describing the influence of railroad bankruptcies on the
reorganization process) [hereinafter Baird & Rasmussen, End ofBankruptcy]; Douglas G.
Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Four (or Five) Easy Lessonsfrom Enron, 55 VAND. L. REV.
1787, 1808 (2002) (attributing the speed of Enron's asset sales in chapter 11 as a"testimony
to the flexibility and creativity of the modem bankruptcy bench") [hereinafter Baird &
Rasmussen, Lessons]; David A. Skeel, Jr., Creditors' Ball: The "New" New Corporate
Governance in Chapter 11, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 917, 917 (2003) ("A decade ago, many
observers believed that Chapter 11 was irretrievably flawed.") [hereinafter Skeel, Creditors'
Ball].
'See Pan Am Corp. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 175 B.R. 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (describing
the failed efforts to reorganize Pan Am).
4
As defined by Baird and Rasmussen:
Control rights allocate decisionmaking authority over the firm's assets and
by their nature are more complex than cash-flow rights. Cash is a single metric;
control is not. Control is the ability to make decisions regarding the deployment
of assets, including human capital. These include decisions both large and small.
They can range from the decision to merge with another firm, to stop producing
a current product, to change suppliers, and so on.
Baird & Rasmussen, End of Bankruptcy, supra note 2, at 779.
'Baird & Rasmussen, Lessons, supra note 2, at 1805.
6 A DIP lender is a debtor-in-possession or post-bankruptcy lender who provides
financing to the debtor during the chapter I1 case. See 11 U.S.C. § 364 (2000) (authorizing
the DIP to incur new debt); see generally George G. Triantis, A Theory of the Regulation of
Debtor-in-PossessionFinancing,46 VAND. L. REV. 901, 901-03 (1993).
7
See Baird & Rasmussen, Lessons, supra note 2, at 1805 ("In the case of a large firm
in bankruptcy, we find that, at the moment Chapter 11 is filed, a revolving credit facility is
already in place that entrusts decisionrnaking authority to a single entity. This entity will
often step in and replace management. It will make the necessary operational decisions
before Chapter 1I begins.").
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today are the legal vehicles by which creditors in control decide which
course of action-sale, prearranged deal, or a conversion of debt to a
controlling equity stake-will maximize their return."'
The control rights turn that chapter 11 has allegedly taken represents
a partial return to the days of the railroad receiverships, which were
characterized by strong "control rights given to the investment bankers."9
While this heritage alone should give us pause, as the receiverships were
of dubious efficacy,'" I ask the reader to put these doubts temporarily to one
side.
Assume for a moment that it is possible to contract for control to the
extent these authors theorize. Chapter 11 has then become a system of
corporate reorganization that is dominated by a single creditor, or at least
a small group of sophisticated creditors. Is this a good thing? Speed of
resolution is the obvious benefit, and the reason why these leading scholars
believe that chapter 11 is much improved. But what are the costs?
I begin this paper by addressing two basic questions. First, should
chapter 11 be dominated by a parochial group? And second, who might
suffer under such a regime? In particular, I look at whether chapter 11 is
appropriately deployed to address a firm's financial distress when that firm
has already allocated its control rights to a single actor or a concentrated
group of actors, like a DIP lender. Unlike Baird, Rasmussen, and Skeel
before me, I express some skepticism about the new state of affairs. While
these authors have performed an extremely valuable service by spotlighting
the importance of lender control in modern chapter 11 cases, and the
companion fact that the priority concerns of old are no longer cardinal," it
'Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter II at Twilight, 56 STAN. L. REV.
673, 675 (2003) [hereinafter Baird & Rasmussen, Twilight].
9
Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Control Rights, PriorityRights, and the
ConceptualFoundationsof CorporateReorganizations,87 VA. L. REV. 921,932-33 (2001);
David A. Skeel, Jr., The Past,Presentand Futureof Debtor-in-PossessionFinancing,25
CARDOZO L. REV. 1905 (2004) (tracing the historical growth of powerful DIP lenders to the
days of railroad receiverships) [hereinafter Skeel, Past, PresentandFuture].
" See Stephen J.Lubben, RailroadReceiverships and Modern Bankruptcy Theory, 89

CORNELL L. REV. 1420 (2004) (reporting data that railroads that reorganized under a
receivership subsequently failed at a rate more than twice as high as railroads that had never
gone through a receivership and almost three times as high as modem chapter 11 debtors)
[hereinafter Lubben, Railroad Receiverships]. Baird and Rasmussen argue that the
distinction between the modem control rights regime and the railroads of the past turns on
the fact that "[c]apital structures today are better designed." Baird & Rasmussen, Twilight,

supra note 8, at 696.
" Key examples of this older literature include Barry E. Adler, A Theory of Corporate
Insolvency, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 343 (1997); Philippe Aghion et al., The Economics of
Bankruptcy Reform, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 523 (1992); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New
Approach to CorporateReorganizations, 101 HARV. L. REV. 775 (1988); Mark J. Roe,
Bankruptcy andDebt: A New Modelfor CorporateReorganization,83 COLUM. L. REV. 527
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is not clear that this development promotes social welfare. Rather, lender
control may only benefit lenders.
I next consider whether the empirical story told by these authors is
plausible. Again in contrast to the leading scholars, I argue that control in
a large modem firm is often inherently ambiguous and that control rights
are always relative and state-dependent. I further argue that this ambiguity
counsels for a collective solution like chapter 11. In short, I argue that the
spread of the "new" chapter 11 is not clearly for the best, but the extent of
that spread is likely overstated.
I tackle these arguments in the remaining four parts of this paper. Part
I establishes the basic framework of control rights. It describes the concept
of control rights and how leading chapter 11 theorists believe that the
development of strong control rights has reformed the chapter 11 process.
According to these authors, improved contracting has allowed parties to
distribute control rights through sophisticated contracts. In the presence of
these contracts, chapter 11 assumes the vestigial role of facilitating the
wishes of the party with control. Thus, chapter 11 is no longer a negotiated
process among classes of creditors.
Part II looks at the implications of this conception of chapter 11. Here
I probe the new chapter II along two fronts, examining both the normative
implications of a chapter 11 that bends to a controlling creditor's will and
the practical question of whether the "control rights" conception of chapter
11 leaves it with any justifiable role. In particular, if control rights are now
allocated as described by these authors, what does chapter 11 offer that
could not be achieved outside bankruptcy? And, more to the point, are there
any benefits to filing chapter 11 that do not involve wealth transfers to the
controlling creditor and other well-connected parties?
Similarly, even assuming that the control rights revolution in chapter
11 is true as a descriptive matter, as I assume in this part of the paper, it
does not follow that this development is normatively sound. Without
revisiting the seemingly endless debates about the broader normative
purpose of business bankruptcy that a prior generation of scholars has
already worked through many times, it bears considering whether placing
senior lenders in charge of chapter 11 is really a good thing. In particular,
the control rights version of chapter 11 is undeniably a good thing if we
agree that the "things" that chapter 11 should maximize are the interests of
senior lenders. The normative desirability of the control rights model
(1983). Recent reviews of this literature include Susan Block-Lieb, The Logic andLimits
of Contract Bankruptcy, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 503, and Stephen J. Lubben, Some Realism
About Reorganization:Explaining the Failure of Chapter 11 Theory, 106 DICK. L. REV.

267, 270 (2001) (criticizing prior "efficiency-based conception[s] of corporate reorganization" as "doomed ... from their inception") [hereinafter Lubben, Realism].
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becomes more suspect if we instead believe, as most scholars probably do,
that the one clear and desirable goal of chapter 11 is to maximize the value
of the bankrupt firm. I" Improving the position of senior lenders does not
necessarily advance this goal.
In Part III ultimately conclude that, if the control rights description of
the new chapter 11 is accurate, chapter 11 will only be used when it
benefits the controlling creditor, and we should expect these sorts of
creditors to capture most or all of these benefits. Moreover, we should
expect that in some cases the use of chapter 11 under a control rights
regime will not be efficient; any gains come with corresponding losses to
non-consenting parties. 3 Even though controlling creditors could potentially improve the chapter 11 process by obtaining a position that prevents
debtors from overreaching in chapter 11, they are equally likely to use this
position to collude with the debtor and its senior management to share
gains that would have otherwise gone to junior creditors.
I also argue that the control rights theorists have tended to gloss over
the differences between maximizing the controlling creditors' interests and
maximizing the value of the bankrupt firm.14 Thus, the normative
justifications for the control rights reinterpretation of chapter 11 are
woefully underdeveloped. At best, the efforts at providing a normative
justification for the new chapter 11 appear to be little more than an
argument that the presumed ends justify the means.
In short, the growth of a control rights model of chapter 11 reduces
transparency and leaves the utility of reorganization unsettled. All cases
under the control rights model will feature controlling lenders who capture
most of the debtor's value. In some cases the debtor's value will have
actually increased as a result of chapter 11; in others the debtor's value will
simply be shifted among the parties. The unknown (perhaps unknowable)
empirical issue is which of the two cases dominates. Without answering
that question, the benefits of the new face of chapter 11 are, at best,
unclear. Similarly unclear are the normative justifications for allowing
senior lenders to maximize their interests, apparently even if those interests
12

See, e.g., THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 22-27

(1986).
13As used throughout this paper, references to "efficiency" are intended to invoke a
kind ofmodified Kaldor-Hicks efficiency that assumes that extreme distributional unfairness
will not be tolerated, but that every system involves some degree of sorting between
"winners" and "losers." The concept is undeniably imprecise, but similar tools have been
recognized by others as a useful basis for discussion. See, e.g., REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL.,
THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 18 n.32
(2004).
"4Others have also noted the tendency to conflate senior creditors with creditors in
general. See, e.g., Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Control of Wealth in Bankruptcy, 82 TEX.
L. REV. 795, 860 (2004).
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conflict with the broader goal of maximizing the value of the estate.
Arguably the new face of chapter 11 moves business bankruptcy further
away from its core goal of decreasing the overall costs of business failure.
Part III then asks if any real firm can actually point to a specific
investor with absolute control over its assets? And can investors know
when a particular state of the world holds, so that control might transfer to
the optimal party? Because the answer to both questions must be "no," I
argue that the contention that control rights can lead to the end of corporate
bankruptcy as we know it is unfounded, even wrong.
Control is never coherently allocated in most real firms. Instead,
creditors bargain with a firm-or, more precisely, its management-for
degrees of leverage in the negotiations that will follow the firm's future
collapse, if that collapse ever comes. The allocation of control rights at the
point of financial distress will thus reflect the end-point of an ongoing,
dynamic process.
At any point in time, even when the firm must decide whether or not to
liquidate, myriad parties will possess some ability to force the firm to
follow a particular course of action, though none will have the ability to
make an effective decision alone. Control rights are made up of formal, or
legal, and informal, or functional, components, and no one party is likely
to have a monopoly on all aspects of control. Moreover, whether a firm
should continue or fold is itself a question that, without the benefit of
hindsight, is fraught with doubt and ambiguity. Ambiguity with respect to
the ultimate form of control-control over the liquidation decisionconfirms the need for a collective process like chapter 11.
The idea of ambiguous control rights goes beyond the difficulty of
identifying a firm's residual owner-which, as many authors have already
noted, is inordinately difficult at best-and instead shows that large firms
never allocate control or decision rights to a single, residual claimant.
Parties throughout the firm's capital structure may be given the right to
control a firm's destiny. At most, the allocation of these control rights
represents nothing more than stakes on degrees of control, the ultimate
value of which is both highly relative and state-dependent. Formal control
may have little relation to actual functional control.15 In this context,
chapter 11 provides a forum for an organized resolution of these competing
claims.
" The recent strike threats by unions at bankrupt airlines is an example of this idea in
action. Employees have very little formal control in comparison to lenders, but their
functional control can be tremendous. See Keith L. Alexander, Attendant Union Approves
Strike over Contracts, WASH. POST, Nov. 17, 2004, at E3 ("The president of the nation's
largest flight attendants union yesterday vowed that its members would go on a nationwide

strike if US Airways and United Airlines are allowed to nullify their labor contracts in
bankruptcy court.").
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Part IV then closes with a brief consideration of why we should not be
too surprised that the "new chapter 11" devised by leading theorists leaves
chapter 11 without any real or unique function whatsoever. For years these
theorists have bemoaned the mandatory, non-market tilt of chapter 11.
Underlying many ofthese complaints was an unstated assumption that more
frequent liquidation or sale of firms-leaving any reorganization to new
owners-would be both desirable and efficient. Having found that some
chapter 11 debtors have adopted something close to this approach in
practice, some scholars have rushed to embrace this trend as the new face
of chapter 11. As I argue in conclusion, whether or not the rise of control
rights is indeed a new trend in corporate reorganization, or simply a
preexisting subcurrent that academics have stumbled upon, it is hardly a
phenomenon that should be embraced without hesitation.
I.

THE CONCEPTION OF CONTROL RIGHTS

Control rights (e.g., voting rights, liquidation rights, board
membership) have been well ventilated in the finance literature for more
than a decade. 16 This literature has explored the key qualitative features of
corporate securities, explaining why securities have different rights at
different times in a firm's life. To oversimplify, the literature has coalesced
around the idea that control rights are allocated to certain parties, often
contingent7 on some observable signal, to bridge gaps in incomplete
contracts.'
This literature has implications for all bankruptcies, chapter 11 in
particular. Accordingly, by the middle 1990s several finance articles had
discussed how the efficient allocation of control rights during times of
distress could be effectuated through bankruptcy systems. 8 It is this
literature that several legal scholars have drawn upon to support their
claims about the transformation of chapter 11. According to the "hard"
form of the legal "control rights" argument, "[m]odern firms may have
6

For a very readable summary of the literature, see Oliver Hart, FinancialContracting,

39 J. ECON. LIT. 1079 (2001), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_
center/papers/327hart.php. For some recent applications, see Steven N. Kaplan & Per
Str6mberg, FinancialContractingTheory Meets the Real World. An EmpiricalAnalysis of
Venture Capital Contracts, 70 REv. ECON. STUD. 281 (2003); JUKKA VAUHKONEN,
FINANCIAL CONTRACTS AND CONTINGENT CONTROL RIGHTS, BANK OF FINLAND DISCUSSION

PAPER No. 14/2003, availableathttp://ssrn.com/abstract=438501.
7
See generallyOLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE (1995).
8
See, e.g., Phillippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, An Incomplete ContractsApproach to
FinancialContracting,59 REV. ECoN. STUD. 473 (1992); Elazar Berkovitch & Ronen Israel,
The Design oflnternalControl and CapitalStructure,9 REV. FIN. STUD.209 (1996); Julian
R. Franks & Kjell G. Nyborg, Control Rights, Debt Structure, and the Loss of Private
Benefits: The Case of the U.K. Insolvency Code, 9 REV. FIN. STUD. 1165 (1996).
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complicated and dynamic divisions of control rights. These rights are
nevertheless coherent in the sense that they represent a bargained
agreement among investors about who should exercise control over the
firm's assets in any particular state of the world."' 9
The development of new contracting techniques is said to allocate
firms' control rights in a manner that permits investors to liquidate unviable
firms, obviating the need for traditional chapter 11 reorganization in almost
all cases.2"
Thus, chapter 11 continues to be used only "because, as a legal matter,
it provides a cheaper mechanism for assuring the buyer clean title than state
law."" Chapter 11 will also be used "not because there is a collective
action problem but because it is the easiest way for ... [senior creditors]
to extinguish junior stakeholders."22 Chapter 11 thus becomes a process of
honoring the controlling creditors' wishes with regard to the debtor's assets
and allocating proceeds among competing claimants.23
As Baird and Rasmussen, the leading proponents of the hard form of
the control rights theory, summarize:
In the case of a large firm in bankruptcy, we find that, at the moment
Chapter 11 is filed, a revolving credit facility is already in place that
entrusts decisionmaking authority to a single entity. This entity will often
make the necessary operational
step in and replace management. It will
24
decisions before Chapter 11 begins.
David Skeel has argued for a somewhat more modest version of the
control rights theory, asserting that the growth of strong post-petition
lenders (a.k.a. DIP lenders) is a key factor in the improvement of chapter

19Baird & Rasmussen, Lessons, supra note 2, at 1805. Baird and Rasmussen later
explained that "[t]o say that control rights tend to be allocated coherently is to say that those
who have a voice in making this decision have both the skill and the incentive to make it
correctly." Baird & Rasmussen, Twilight, supra note 8, at 695.
20 See Baird & Rasmussen, End of Bankruptcy, supra note 2, at 777 ("A viable firm

requires Chapter 11 only ifthose who control it cannot collectively make coherent decisions
outside the bankruptcy forum."); Baird & Rasmussen, Lessons, supra note 2, at 1804
("Many large modem Chapter 11 cases begin only after those in control have already
decided to sell the firm's assets."); Baird & Rasmussen, Twilight, supra note 8, at 695.
2 1 Baird & Rasmussen, Lessons, supra note 2, at 1805; see also 11. U.S.C. § 363(f)
(2000) (specifying the circumstances under which a trustee can sell property unencumbered
by third party interests).
22 Baird & Rasmussen, Twilight, supra note 8, at 696.
23 See, e.g., Baird & Rasmussen, End ofBankruptcy, supra note 2, at 785 ("[It is the
lender, and not the Bankruptcy Code or the bankruptcy judge, that is deciding how long the
managers will have to make a go of things.").
24 Baird & Rasmussen, Lessons, supra note 2, at 1805.
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11 from the dark days of its 1980s past.25 Instead of focusing on ex ante
lending agreements, Skeel's account of the new chapter 11 argues that
post-petition lending agreements, blessed by the bankruptcy courts under
§ 364 of the Bankruptcy Code,2 explain the new state of affairs.
In particular, Skeel argues that debtors are increasingly reliant on DIP
lenders for their long-term survival, and this dependence gives the lenders
power to exercise more oversight in the chapter 11 case.27 He argues that
DIP lenders have emerged as an alternative source of power in a bankruptcy
system that imposed few limitations on managerial discretion when
originally enacted in 1978.28 DIP loans have repaired chapter 11 by giving
lenders the control rights once exercised under receiverships by investment
bankers, and under Chapter X ofthe old Bankruptcy Act by trustees and the
SEC.29

Unlike Baird and Rasmussen, however, Skeel does not contend that this
is uniformly a good thing, even though he tends to be rather optimistic
about the role DIP lenders play. He suggests that a regime of DIP lender
control will generally result in managerial discipline, which he analogizes
to the market for corporate control outside of bankruptcy.3" He argues that
managerial discipline is further enhanced by the advent of managerial
retention agreements, which lenders can use to align management's
incentives with the aims of the lender.31
Under either conception of control, lenders (be they ex ante or expost)
play important roles in a firm's chapter 11 case. Under the Baird and
Rasmussen "hard" conception of control rights, long before financial
distress these lenders lock up virtually complete power to make decisions
about how a firm's assets are used. 2 Skeel's "soft" conception of control
25 Skeel, Creditors' Ball, supra note 2, at 921-22.
26

11 U.S.C. § 364 (2000). The importance of this section of the Code is described by

Skeel: "The magical provision is Section 364, which authorizes the bankruptcy court to roll
out the red carpet for a lender that is willing to make a new loan to the debtor." Skeel,
Creditors' Ball, supra note 2, at 923.
27 Skeel, Creditors' Ball, supra note 2, at 925 ("Lenders ...[are] using the terms of
DIP loans to shape the Chapter I1 case.").
28 Skeel, Past,Present and Future, supra note 9, at 1916.
29See id.
30 Skeel, Creditors 'Ball, supra note 2, at 921-22.
31Id. at 943-44. Section 331 ofthe recently enacted Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005 prohibits retention bonuses unless the bonus is essential
to retain a person who has "a bona fide job offer from another business at the same or a
greater rate of compensation." Section 331 also contains overall size limits on retention and
severance payments. Plainly this provision has serious implications for Skeel's argument.
See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 331

(2005).
32 See Baird & Rasmussen, End of Bankruptcy, supra note 2, at 779; Baird &
Rasmussen, Lessons, supra note 2, at 1804.
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is less direct: lenders have no direct power over assets, but they have the
ability to discipline the debtor's management and reward them for desired
behavior, thus mitigating the conflicting interests between managers and
creditors that might otherwise exist.
Under this approach, control rights allow DIP lenders to direct the
reorganization at the margins rather than steer the process in its entirety.
But the result is largely the same: under either the hard or soft version of
the control rights story, a select group of creditors now dominates the
chapter 11 process, and the only disagreement is on the extent of dominion.
The implications of a reorganization system dominated by a select
group of creditors is the subj ect-of the next part of this paper.
Il.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF LENDER DOMINATION

There are plainly several debatable factual assertions imbedded in the
control rights account of modem chapter 11 practice, particularly in its hard
form, and other authors have already pointed out some of these issues in
other papers. 3 But, as stated at the outset, this part of the paper operates
under the assumption that the control rights story is correct-that is,
chapter 11 has become dominated by either ex ante or ex post lenders,
depending on which version of control rights one adopts.34
Before the advent of the new chapter 11, reorganization was a
collective enterprise and state debtor-creditor law addressed individual
creditor collection efforts.3" Closely related to this collective conception of
chapter 11 was the frequent argument that "the paramount policy and goal
of Chapter 11, to which all other bankruptcy policies are subordinated, is
the rehabilitation of the debtor."36 Under the new approach, chapter 11 has
" See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, The Nature of the Bankrupt Firm: A Response to Baird
and Rasmussen's The End of Bankruptcy, 56 STAN. L. REV. 645 (2003) [hereinafter
LoPucki, Nature of the Bankrupt Firm].
14 The assumption is not entirely unrealistic; some version of the control rights story
undoubtedly holds. See Elizabeth Warren & Jay L. Westbrook, SecuredPartyin Possession,

AM. BANKR. INST. J., Sept. 22, 2003, at 12; see also Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Dick Corp., 351
F.3d 290 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied 124 S. Ct. 2103 (2004).
" See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, CorporateReorganizationsand
the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of
Secured Creditorsin Bankruptcy, 51 U. CI. L. REV. 97, 105-06 (1984); Lynn M. LoPucki,
Strange Visions in a Strange World: A Reply to Professors Bradley and Rosenzweig, 91
MICH. L. REV. 79 (1992); David A. Skeel, Jr., Markets, Courts, and the Brave New World
of Bankruptcy Theory, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 465, 492-93 (describing the problems arising
under pre-chapter 11 debtor-creditor law) [hereinafter Skeel, Brave New World].
36 In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 98 B.R. 174, 176 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989); see also

United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 203 (1983) (describing the economic
benefits of reorganization); Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co., 406 U.S. 416,
422-23 (1972) ("In contradistinction to a bankruptcy proceeding where liquidation of a
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moved closer to the state-law model.37 Secured creditors have replaced the
collective under the new approach, and the bankruptcy court and junior
creditors are reduced to a subsidiary role that is only triggered if the
proceeds of the senior creditor's chosen disposition exceed its claims.
Reorganization is not a good in and of itself; it is only pursued if it meets
the controlling creditor's objectives.
But if a lender is vested with control rights immediately upon a firm's
failure and will place that firm in chapter 11 only to sell or otherwise
redeploy the firm's assets, why chapter 11 ? As noted, Baird and Rasmussen
respond that chapter 11 should be used because it facilitates asset sales and

the removal ofjunior claimants.38 In short, chapter 11 offers better rules for
selling a firm than state law.
Baird has previously argued, as part of the well-known Baird and
Jackson team, that
[c]hanges in substantive rules unrelated to preserving assets for the
collective good of the investor group . . .run counter to the goals of

bankruptcy. Such rule changes in bankruptcy can induce an individual
investor to seek bankruptcy merely to gain access to rule changes that
offer him benefits, regardless of whether there are any benefits-or indeed
costs-to the investor group as a whole.39

This claim for parity between bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy law is
sometimes referred to as the Butner rule.4 ° If Baird and Rasmussen mean
to argue that controlling parties will file chapter 11 cases only to take

advantage of provisions like Bankruptcy Code § 363(f)-which allows
assets to be sold free and clear of certain liens, in certain instances4 '-the
control rights argument clearly represents a departure from the rule.
corporation and distribution of its assets is the goal, a Chapter X proceeding is for the
purposes of rehabilitating the corporation and reorganizing it.").
'" For a very clear discussion of the distinction between state and federal
debtor-creditor law, with particular focus on the rights of secured creditors, see Westbrook,
supra note 14, at 806-18.
3 Baird & Rasmussen, Lessons, supra note 2, at 1807 (using the Enron bankruptcy

proceeding as an example); Baird & Rasmussen, Twilight, supra note 8, at 696
("[Companies] use Chapter 11 not because there is a collective action problem but because
it is the easiest way for them to extinguish junior stakeholders that are out of the money.").
'9Baird & Jackson, supra note 35, at 101.
40 See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) ("Unless some federal interest
requires a different result, there is no reason why such [property] interests should be
analyzed differently simply because an interested party is involved in a bankruptcy
proceeding."); see also Julianna M. Thomas, Note, Fifteen Years After Weintraub: Who
Controls the Individual'sAttorney-Client Privilege in Bankruptcy?, 80 B.U. L. REV. 635,

654-55 (2000) (describing the operation of the Butner rule).

4
See generally George W. Kuney, Bankruptcy Code§ 363Wt: A Misinterpretationthat
Undermines the Chapter 11 Process, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 235 (2002).
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Others have already noted that the Butner parity rule represents an
implicit choice in favor of non-bankruptcy debtor-creditor law,42 and that
doing so inherently means favoring certain parties (secured creditors) over
other parties (unsecured creditors).43 Although the proponents of the Butner
rule have sometimes denied such an intent, 44 it seems rather plain that this
choice is entirely consistent with a view of bankruptcy as nothing more
than a device to overcome creditors' collective action problems. 5 If
bankruptcy only addresses instances of contract failure, a preference for
state law, whatever its merits, is logical because it generally governs most
contract disputes.
In any event, we should certainly be suspicious of a chapter 11 case
that is filed solely to provide a secured lender with an alternate forum for
its foreclosure sale. While it is conceivable that bankruptcy-specific rules
might advance the interests of the overall group of creditors, it is doubtful
that a senior lender would choose chapter I I for this reason.
Before pursuing this line of argument further, however, consider the
implicit normative choice that the control rights proponents have already
made at this point: chapter 11 properly provides a tool for achieving the
senior creditors' objectives. Scholars of all stripes have generally assumed
that the one core normative goal of chapter 11 is to maximize the value of
the bankrupt firm.46 Whether chapter 11 has or should have goals beyond
this is, to understate it wildly, subject to much debate, but the maximization
goal appears to be widely accepted.47
42 See Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 804 (1987)
(describing the costs that would accompany straying from state debtor-creditor law).
43 See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor'sBargain, 80 VA. L. REV. 1887,
1945-46 (1994).
44 See Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution,ForumShopping, andBankruptcy:A Reply
to Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 815, 823-24 (1987).
4"Note, however, that Baird apparently believes that solving collective action problems
is no longer the primary purpose of chapter 11. See Baird & Rasmussen, Twilight, supra
note 8, at 696.
46See, e.g., Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-BankruptcyEntitlements, and the
Creditors' Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857, 864 (1982) (describing how a "non-piecemeal
bankruptcy process" maximizes the value of assets); Robert K. Rasmussen & David A.
Skeel, Jr., The Economic Analysis of Corporate Bankruptcy Law, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REV. 85, 86 (1995) ("An efficient bankruptcy law... should ensure that post bankruptcy
assets are put to the highest valued use."); Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policymakingin
an Imperfect World, 92 MICH. L. REV. 336,344-45 (1993) [hereinafter Warren, Bankruptcy
Policymaking].
41 Several argue that bankruptcy is something more than just debt collection in a new
forum. See, e.g., Susan Block-Lieb, supra note 11, at 519-20 (describing additional
purposes of bankruptcy law); Karen Gross, Taking Community Interests into Account in
Bankruptcy: An Essay, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1031, 1038-43 (1994) (suggesting that communitarian concepts should be incorporated into bankruptcy law); Donald R. Korobkin,
Value and Rationality in Bankruptcy Decisionmaking, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 333, 365
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Although maximizing the value obtained by senior lenders might be
consistent with bankruptcy's general entity maximization goals in some
circumstances, instances plainly exist where the two goals would be in
tension. Consider the controlling lender that utilizes its control to ensure
that the debtor-firm obtains "exit finaning"-that is, post-bankruptcy
financing-only from the controlling lender. Here, the controlling lender
obtains value, but the choice of post-bankruptcy lenders under these
circumstances is unlikely to increase the debtor's value and may even
decrease the firm's overall value.
Thus, the proponents of the control rights model have some obligation
to explain why they have adopted an apparent shift away from chapter I 's
traditional firm maximization goal. In some sense anything that increases
the senior lender's recovery also benefits more junior creditors, as they are
more likely to receive some recovery in the case.4" Maybe. But it is equally
plausible that senior lenders use the Bankruptcy Code to soak up value that
they do not already claim. For example, if a chapter 11 case simply allows
an existing lender to add a new layer of senior debt onto the firm in the
form of a DIP loan, the new chapter 11 is simply a tool for facilitation of
a wealth transfer.49

In this example, I assumed that the debtor's value is rather static; it
remains the same in or out of chapter 11. But what if the debtor's value
actually increases in chapter 11? Here, again, the senior lender could use
the power of the Bankruptcy Code to allocate that new value to itself. At
first blush, there seems to be no good reason to allow a senior lender to use

(1992) (describing the purely economic account of bankruptcy law as "unsuited to resolve
practical conflicts among diverse and incommensurable values that pervade financial
distress"); Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy and the Entitlements of the Government: Whose
Money Is It Anyway?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 993 (1995); Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking,
supranote 47, at 344. The heat from those holding the other point of view is equally intense.
See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy's UncontestedAxioms, 108 YALE L.J. 573, 590
(1998) (challenging the critics of the economic model to more clearly propose an alternative
system); Robert Rasmussen, An Essay on Optimal Bankruptcy Rules and Social Justice,
1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 42 ("[Tlhe most important objection to those who would reject the
economic conception ... based on ... general social injustice is that the[ir] argument fails
in any significant way to link its predicate-the existence of injustice-to its
conclusion-the rejection of what is otherwise ajust bankruptcy regime,"); Alan Schwartz,
A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 107 YALE L.J. 1807 (1998).
" See, e.g., Schwartz, supranote 47, at 1837-38 (arguing that creditor conflicts would

be rare if the absolute priority rule were respected, since all creditors would seek to
maximize the size of the estate).
" This of course assumes, not unrealistically, that the proceeds of the loan do not
necessarily result in a dollar for dollar increase in the value of the debtor's estate. Cf
Stephen J. Lubben, Beyond True Sales: Securitizationand Chapter11, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus.
89, 101-04 (2004).
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chapter 11 solely to benefit itself, especially if we reasonably assume that
chapter 11 is more costly than its state-law counterpart.50
Similarly, any benefit that chapter 11 confers by increasing the price
buyers pay for a debtor's assets may primarily advantage priority claimants
that exist only because of the bankruptcy filing, such as the debtor's
bankruptcy professionals,5' and select junior creditors, such as the parties
to contracts the debtor chooses to assume." The benefits that ultimately
trickle down to the junior creditors as a whole may be slight, even if the
senior creditor never increases the size of its stake. Again, conferring
windfalls on priority claimants and select junior creditors hardly seems a
compelling reason for the use of chapter 11 in the presence of a reasonable
state-law alternative.
In some cases, however, the increased costs of using chapter 11 will be
outweighed by the increased value of the debtor's assets. Although these
cases surely represent an efficient use of chapter 11, identifying them is
rather difficult. Abstractly, a case where the senior lender's expected gains
come directly from expected improvements in the value of the debtor's
assets must be distinguished from a case wheie chapter 11 merely
facilitates a transfer from existing claimants to the lender and other
bankruptcy-specific parties. The transfer in the latter case is made possible
by tools the Bankruptcy Code provides, such as the power to incur senior
debt,53 the power to reject contracts without full realization of breach
damages,54 and the power to assign contracts that would be otherwise
unassignable at state law. 55
Stated more formally, chapter 11 should only be preferred when the
gains (g) from choosing the federal system, minus the unique costs (c) of
using chapter 11 when compared with the state debtor-creditor system, and
minus the value captured by the DIP lender (d) from loans made under
50 While the direct costs of chapter 11 are modest compared to other significant
corporate transactions, see Stephen J. Lubben, The Direct Costs of Corporate
Reorganization: An Empirical Examination of ProfessionalFees in Large Chapter 11
Cases, 74 AM.BANKR. L.J. 509, 542 (2000), they must inevitably exceed the costs of a state
law foreclosure proceeding. One aspect of chapter 11 that represents an improvement over
its railroad receivership predecessors is the degree of transparency that is mandated in
chapter 11. But this transparency comes with costs, as the debtor's lawyers are called upon
to attend meetings with creditors, and the accountants work to prepare the schedules of
assets and liabilities. State foreclosure law mandates none of these steps.
51 See Eric A. Posner, The PoliticalEconomy of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
96 MICH. L. Rcv. 47, 111-12 (1997) (describing lawyers as among the principal
beneficiaries of reorganization).
1 11 U.S.C. § 365(b) (2000).

" § 364.
14 § 365(g).
5 § 365(f).
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§ 364 and by creditors who hold bankruptcy-specific priorities (p), are
greater than or equal to zero:

g-c-d-p>O
These are the cases where we can be sure that chapter 11 represents
something more than a wealth transfer, for the simple reason that the
chapter 11 specific claims do not exceed the unique gains of using chapter
11. But the Bankruptcy Court cannot be expected to determine ex ante what
g will total with any degree of reasonable precision. Only the debtor's
management-if they are able to overcome the kinds of biases that often
cloud managerial decisions in times of financial distress-and the senior
lender are likely to have access to information that could lead to adequate
predictions of these values.
Furthermore, since the size of d is subject to manipulation by the senior
lender, especially with the cooperation of the debtor's management, it is
doubtful that we should ever expect the net gains of chapter 11 under a
control rights regime to be greater than zero. Indeed, it is likely the result
of the equation will always equal zero.
Unless the senior lender underestimates g or the lender is benevolent,
something lenders are rarely accused of, choosing chapter 11 over state
foreclosure only benefits the senior lender-and debtor's management and
other "insiders," to the extent the lender must enlist their aid-because a
rational senior lender will absorb any unclaimed value that might otherwise
go to the junior creditors. Further, it seems unrealistic to assume that
controlling lenders would often significantly err in their valuation of the
debtor. If any party could value the debtor ex ante, we would expect that a
senior lender, entitled to detailed and frequent reports from the debtor,
would be in the best position to do so.
For a concrete example, assume a debtor firm has $300 in secured
claims; $200 in unsecured bondholder, trade, and tort claims; and 100
shares of equity. The liquidation value of the firm is $250, but the firm can
be sold in chapter II for $350 (leave the reason for the increase in value
vague). If the controlling creditor, the secured lender, can reasonably
anticipate these values, it will gladly agree to provide the debtor with up to
$50 in DIP financing. 6 Under § 364, this financing will be given priority
over the unsecured claims, and the lender will take all of the firm's value.
Thus, even in a case where there is a real increase in the value of the
56 I assume that the DIP lender has no desire to engage in a "priming fight" to
subordinate other secured lenders. Cf § 364(d).
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debtor's assets as a result of using chapter 11, the proceeding will only
benefit the controlling lender.
Perhaps it is unrealistic to assume that a secured lender would ever give
a DIP loan for the debtor's full value. But the lender does not need to lend
the full $50. The lender only needs to lend $50 less the value of the claims
held by creditors with bankruptcy-specific priorities (p), since leaving
some portion of the debtor's value unencumbered in favor of these parties
will facilitate the lender's exercise of control.
It is at this point that we can put a new gloss on Skeel's argument that
the new chapter 11 is driven by the dual innovations of strong DIP lenders
and executive retention plans, which Skeel argues align management's
incentives with those of senior creditors." Instead, the growth of retention
agreements, along with "carve outs" for professionals, 8 could be seen as
signs that the controlling creditor is dispensing portions of the debtor's
value in order to ensure the lender's continued control.
But why would the junior claimants stand by while this happened? In
particular, what role would the creditors committee play in this drama?
First, recall that the committee's counsel is one of the professionals who
may benefit from the "carve out" granted by the senior lender, and counsel
always enjoys a bankruptcy-specific priority for its fees.5 9 Many committee
members may also hope to obtain such priority, especially if the senior
lender has agreed to fund "critical vendor" payments or other preferences.6"
Finally, the junior claimants may have little choice but to agree to the
senior lender's wishes; state law foreclosure would be far more painful for
the junior creditors, especially since it would entail the loss of any holdup
power these creditors might have in chapter 11.
The argument has thus come full circle: there are two basic types of
chapter 11 cases under the control rights regime, but the two are almost
indistinguishable as seen from the outside. In the first set of cases, the gains
to senior creditors will come solely from wealth transfers related to the
differences in rights and costs between chapter 11 and state-law foreclosure. For simplicity, call these the "bad" chapter 11 cases.
The bad cases are inefficient on two fronts: sophisticated unsecured
creditors will charge all debtors an ex ante premium to cover their expected
7See Skeel, Creditors' Ball, supra note 2, at 919-20.
s Stated generally, a "carve out" is an agreement by the senior lender to fund some
amount of bankruptcy-related professional fees from the debtor's assets, notwithstanding
the lender's prior claim to those assets. See generallyRichard B. Levin, AlmostAll You Ever
Wanted to Know About Carve Out, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 445 (2002).

'9 11 U.S.C. §§ 1103, 503(b)(2), 507(a)(1).
60 See In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866 (7th Cir.) (discussing critical vendor orders),
cert. denied 125 S. Ct. 495 (2004); see also Lubben, RailroadReceiverships,supra note 10,
at 1448-49 & n.142.
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losses resulting from manipulation of the bankruptcy system, while
involuntary creditors and smaller, less sophisticated creditors will suffer
losses in the form of direct wealth transfers that they will never recoup
because they are unable to extract ex ante premiums. In either instance, the

overall societal costs of financial distress have increased.
The second set of cases, on the other hand, will involve real increases
in the value of the debtor's assets, even after taking into account the
foregoing wealth transfers. Consider, for example, the possibility that in
some cases chapter 11 better facilitates negotiations among creditors and

eliminates the deadweight costs of holdouts compared with state-law
proceedings." The controlling lenders will likely capture this increased
value through a DIP loan. Yet, at least from the perspective of societal

efficiency, these cases should be encouraged. Call these the "good" chapter
11 cases.62
The empirical assumptions one makes about the division of the

universe between good and bad cases will undoubtedly influence one's
acceptance or rejection of the control rights model. Even if we assume that
the world is equally divided among the good and bad chapter 11 cases,

however, the task facing the bankruptcy judge is considerable. In any case
the court will be presented with a controlling lender who, along with a few

priority claimants, will receive almost all of the value of the debtor's assets.
Some cases are the good cases and should be allowed to go forward,
whereas others, the bad cases, should be dismissed and returned to the state

debtor-creditor system.
The judge, informed by experience, will exercise discretion in
removing the cases at the margins on either extreme. Although there is

good evidence that bankruptcy judges do a better job with this task than
previously acknowledged,63 it should be expected that a sizable core of
61 This might be especially likely in cases involving public debt. See Marcel Kahan,

Rethinking Corporate Bonds: The Trade-OffBetween Individual and Collective Rights, 77
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1040, 1055-56 (2002); Mark J. Roe, The Voting Prohibition in Bond
Workouts, 97 YALE L.J. 232, 236-38 (1987).
62To be sure, for many readers the appellation "good" will only hold up if we glide past
any debates about equity among creditors. The worst of these issues could be solved by
adopting a superpriority for involuntary creditors. See Rasmussen & Skeel, supra note 47,
at 86-87 (proposing priority for tort claimants). Better yet, although even more unlikely to
be adopted, are the various proposals to end or pare limited liability with regard to torts. See
Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for
Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1932 (1991); cf Timothy P. Glynn, Beyond
"Unlimiting " Shareholder Liability: Vicarious Tort Liability for Corporate Officers, 57
VAND. L. REV. 329 (2004) (proposing that tort liability be extended to a corporation's
"highest-ranking officers" rather than to its shareholders).
6 Cf Edward R. Morrison, Bankruptcy Decision-Making: An Empirical Study of
Small-Business Bankruptcies (Oct. 7, 2003), available at http://www.ssm.com/abstract=
461031 (examining how well judges make shut-down decisions).
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indeterminate cases remain, with some number ofbad cases lurking among
the good ones. Thus, there are legitimate reasons to be ambivalent about the
new state of chapter 11.
This is a point where the shift in normative goals also comes back into
the mix. If one hews to the traditional goal that chapter 11 should maximize
overall firm value, the foregoing analysis suggests that often chapter 11 will
offer no net benefit over state law. This is especially so if we reasonably
extrapolate from the general goal of maximizing debtor value a secondary
goal: not enriching senior creditors at theexpense ofjunior creditors. But
if the move to a new normative goal of maximizing senior creditor wealth
can be justified, the descriptive view of chapter I II have just presented is
interesting but ultimately unimportant. Indeed, chapter II under this rule
might be a positive development when compared to state debtor-creditor
law.
If the picture is so murky, why then have so many leading scholars
trumpeted this new state of affairs? In part this can be explained by
unannounced empirical assumptions; many of the proponents of the control
rights model probably assume that most chapter 11 cases are good ones,
which avoids the need to address many of the questions I have posed. But
something more is at work here, and I briefly look at this issue in the final
section of the paper. First, however, I turn to consider the plausibility of the
control rights story itself, something I have accepted to this point.
III.

RECONSIDERING THE CONTROL RIGHTS STORY

On some level bankruptcy scholars have been trying to contract their
way out of chapter 11 almost since the day it was enacted.' The recurrent
problem has been finding a party whose self interests will advance the
collective good of the firm. By asserting that modem know-how has fixed
the problem, the control rights proponents are able to sidestep this morass
and proclaim the obsolescence of the old chapter 1 65
Determining which creditor is at the bottom of the heap at any given
time is a difficult exercise that does not lend itself to ex ante contracting,
as asset values may change daily and the nature and extent of a firm's
4 For a summary of this prior scholarship, see supra note 11.
65 See Baird & Rasmussen, Lessons, supra note 2, at 1805 ("[I]n the case of many

modem, new-economy firms, the enterprise is designed so that the firm enters bankruptcy

only after all the economic opportunities associated with the assets have been exhausted.");
see also Baird & Rasmussen, End ofBankruptcy, supranote 2, at 780 ("[W]e have learned
a lot in the last century. Investors are now better able to anticipate financial distress. When

writing investment contracts, they know not to allow managers unfettered control when
things go poorly. By the same account, junior investors know that senior creditors should
not be able to act opportunistically when the firm is worth keeping intact.").
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liabilities change with every purchase order issued or invoice paid.66
Moreover, any current residual claimant is likely to have the appropriate
incentives to maximize firm value only so long as they remain the residual
claimant, leaving the firm in the hands of an inappropriate party once a new
claimant assumes the residual position.6 7
But the quest for a residual claimant is itself misguided. Even assuming
such a claimant could be identified-and I tend to agree with those who
think it unlikely-a residual claimant would never have the kind of
complete control over a firm's fate that is necessary for the control rights
contentions to hold. A residual claimant would be residual in the sense of
having the right to whatever value is left in the firm after senior claimants
are paid; no residual claimant, even a sole equity owner, has complete
power over the use of a firm's assets, unless we make the dubious
assumption that the firm is categorically debt free.68 In short, finding a
residual claimant is irrelevant to the larger issue of identifying a party or
group with control rights.
To clarify this argument, it will be helpful to define "control" with
more precision, and with a more functional meaning than I have used thus
far. This requires consideration of control along two dimensions: formal
control rather than actual control, and control at the margins rather than
control across a range of details. In the first instance we are dealing with
control as contemplated under state corporate law, for example,juxtaposed
with functional control from a business perspective. In the second instance
we are dealing with control or power to make a firm's continuation or
investment decisions, juxtaposed with the power to make its more routine
operational decisions.69
Parties may possess various forms of control, depending on the facts at
hand, and a party's apparent control may have little relationship with
functional reality. In times of financial distress a secured lender is vested
with a good deal of formal control, though secured lenders rarely exercise

66 See Lubben, Realism, supra note 11, at 279.
67 See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the

Bankruptcy Reorganization ofLarge, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 669,
771-76 (1993).
6' As I argued in an earlier article, any attempt to operate a firm with an equity-only
capital structure would be both impractical and costly, as management would be compelled
either to retain a large portion of the firm's assets as cash or adopt a conglomerate structure
to internalize funding needs. Lubben, Realism, supra note 11, at 286.
69 Baird and Rasmussen assume that formal control perfectly tracks actual control and

are often unclear about whether their conception of control rights includes marginal or
operational control. Skeel, on the other hand, more clearly states that his controlling lenders
exercise non-operational, coercive control over the debtor.
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these formal legal rights.7" A secured lender's actual control in times of
distress comes from its ability to control the debtor's future access to cash,
rather than its rights in the debtor's assets.7
Trade creditors have little formal control in times of financial distress.
They are typically unsecured, often highly reliant on a debtor's ongoing
business, and thus generally unwilling to press for the prompt payment of
invoices even as chapter 11 looms near. But if the debtor hopes to
reorganize and continue as a going concern, the trade creditor may have a
good deal of informal, marginal control, especially if the transaction in
question involves significant asset specificity.72 For example, the railroad
that is owed money for past shipments is formally indistinguishable from
any other unsecured creditor. But if the debtor's plant relies on regular
deliveries of raw materials, especially if the deliveries are too bulky to
come by other means, the railroad has the ability to shut down the plant by
refusing future shipments. This exemplifies an unsecured creditor's
informal ability, at the margins, to force a liquidation.
In bankruptcy, each claimant's short-term actual and marginal control
are limited by the imposition of the automatic stay,73 but no single party has
the ability to impose a sale or reorganization on the firm and the other
claimants in all circumstances. A secured lender can threaten to quit
supplying cash ifthe debtor does not sell the firm within a certain time, but
the key suppliers can retort that a quick sale would destroy the prospect of
future trade with the debtor, thus making the debtor's past unpaid invoices
less forgivable. Would not the secured lender prefer to ensure that the
debtor is still a going concern when the sale closes?74
Moreover, it bears noting at this point that the contention that a
coherent allocation of control rights determines "who should exercise
control over the firm's assets in any particular state of the world"75 relies
on the assumption that these states of the world are observable either
o See generally Ronald J. Mann, Strategy and Force in the Liquidation of Secured
Debt, 96 MICH. L. REv. 159 (1997).
7' See Westbrook, supra note 14, at 816-17.
72 Cf Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics, in 1 HANDBOOK OF
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 143 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989)
("[A]sset specificity not only elicits complex ex ante incentive responses, but, even more
important, it gives rise to complex ex post governance structure.").
7 See 11. U.S.C. § 362 (2000).
4 For example, if the debtor owes the supplier $100 on unpaid pre-bankruptcy
invoices, but the supplier expects to make future sales with a present value of $150,
continuing the relationship with the debtor makes sense because the supplier stands to make

a net gain of $50 even if it receives nothing on the unpaid invoices. If the supplier cannot
expect to make future sales with a present value of at least $100, there is no reason to
continue to trade with the debtor.
" Baird & Rasmussen, Lessons, supra note 2, at 1805.
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directly or by way of a reliable signal. In particular, although they never
address it, Baird and Rasmussen plainly presume a dichotomous world-a
world where success and failure are clearly identifiable and are the only
possible results for a firm. This assumption is behind much of the appeal
of their argument. It is easy to decide what to do when firms clearly
succeed or fail, so why should a court do what the parties could do by
contract? But their assumption fails to account for a more realistic world
in which success or failure is a function of which yardstick the firm is
measured against. In this more realistic world, continuation is a function of
the following matrix:
Continuation
is ...

Suboptimal

Optimal

Profitable

(positive NPV but
better projects exist)

(turnaround is
possible)

Unprofitable

(delaying the
inevitable)

n/a

Distinguishing among these states of the world and accurately
describing that distinction in an ex ante contract,76 particularly with regard
to those states in the top row, is highly problematic and further weakens the
picture of coherency that Baird and Rasmussen need for their arguments to
hold. If the parties are unable to determine which state of the world they are
in, how can they agree ex ante "who should exercise control over the firm's
assets in any particular state of the world"?"
In sum, no claimant has control rights to the full extent Baird and
Rasmussen suggest. This is in large part because the congruence they
assume between legal and actual control is unfounded, and the crisp states
of the world they rely on are belied by a more opaque reality. Moreover, it
is unclear that senior lenders would ever seek full control in a world where
they must act in the shadow of potential lender liability.78 Lender liability
76The state of the world reflected by the lower, right comer of the table reflects a
situation where continued operation of the firm might be unprofitable, yet some party
benefits from continuation, such as a controlling shareholder or a non-claimant constituency.
I assume that such benefits are not recognized reasons for continuing to operate a
money-losing firm, but real world examples do exist (e.g., Amtrak).
7 Baird & Rasmussen, Lessons, supra note 2, at 1805.
7 See, e.g., K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985) (finding
lender liable to borrower after lender cut off financing to borrower); A. Gay Jenson Farms
Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 285 (Minn. 1981) (holding creditor liable for debtor's
breach of contract to third-parties under theory that lending created agency relationship

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 93

effectively transforms the lending relationship from one where returns are
normally distributed to one where the downside risks are, at least
theoretically, unlimited-an undeniably strong incentive to avoid complete
control.
But are my hypothetical debtors typical? Might Baird and Rasmussen
have a different type of firm in mind when they argue that modem firms
reflect a sensible, agreed upon allocation of control rights? Maybe, but the
two examples they offer, TWA and Webvan, hardly illustrate their
argument any better. In their Lessons from Enron article,79 Baird and
Rasmussen point to TWA in support of their claim that
large modem Chapter 11 cases begin only after those in control have
already decided to sell the firm's assets. Shortly after bankruptcy is filed,
the bankruptcy judge oversees the sale of the firm's assets and ensures that
the assets may be transferred free of the contention among those who have
competing claims."0

TWA did indeed sell itself to American Airlines shortly after filing for
chapter 11 protection. But who exercised the control rights at TWA and
decided on the sale? American provided post-petition funding for TWA
during the bankruptcy, but since it clearly was not a "senior lender" before
it committed to the acquisition, it could not be the control party Baird and
Rasmussen would identify as having the final say over the firm's assets. 8'
Indeed, there is no clear control party at work in the TWA case. At
best, management could be identified as having the "control rights" to
decide the firm's fate. Yet Baird and Rasmussen are not concerned with
control rights qua control rights, but rather with control rights that compel
an efficient allocation of assets. Vesting non-owner management with
control rights hardly seems to meet this test.
Webvan is no more illustrative of the coherent allocation of control
rights. In Lessons from Enron, Baird and Rasmussen refer to Webvan to
support the contention that "in the case of many modem, new-economy
firms, the enterprise is designed so that the firm enters bankruptcy only
after all the economic opportunities associated with the assets have been
exhausted. 8 2 In a subsequent article in the StanfordLaw Review, they take
the point further, arguing that "[f]rom beginning to end, control of
between creditor and debtor).
"9Baird & Rasmussen, Lessons, supra note 2.
'old. at 1804.

81See id.
Baird & Rasmussen do not explain why TWA is more typical than USAir or
United Airlines, both of which are pursuing more traditional reorganization cases. Similarly,
Webvan
is said to be typical, and, by implication, other retailers like Kmart are not. Why?
82
1d. at 1805.
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Webvan's assets rested with those in the best position to make the strategic
decisions."83
Webvan appears to be a better illustration of managerial free
agency-refrains of Berle and MeansS4-- than of the coherent allocation of
control rights. It also provides a possible example of the difficulties that
controlling parties have in distinguishing among states of the world when
making the continuation decision.
Webvan only called it a day when it had run through its
once-prodigious hoard of cash, by which point it was able to repay its
unsecured debts at less than half of their face value. 5 Why this result was
any more efficient than liquidation at any other point in time, perhaps when
creditors could have received something close to face value for their claims,
is left entirely unexplained.
If control rights are generally not coherently allocated in modem firms,
but are instead subject to a large degree of vagueness, Baird and
Rasmussen's companion assertion that the allocation of control rights
within a firm represents a bargained-for agreement seems equally suspect.
Plainly, any sort of actual bargaining among the myriad claimants that
interact with a large firm is unrealistic given the transaction costs
involved-that is why corporate entities exist.8 6 I take it that Baird and
Rasmussen instead argue that the allocation of control rights represents a
kind of consent to one's place within a firm's financial structure.
Not unexpectedly, this precludes any participation by involuntary
creditors in the allocation of control rights.87 Moreover, the idea of tacit
consent to the allocation of control is implausible in light of the foregoing
discussion. Can it be that Webvan's creditors really bargained for (i.e.
consented to) management's decision to operate the firm until it could not
be operated any more?
Although I have focused on the hard form of the control rights
argument advanced by Baird and Rasmussen, David Skeel's more modest
post-bankruptcy control rights story is equally problematic. Whether preBaird & Rasmussen, End of Bankruptcy, supra note'2, at 781.
s See generally ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
" LoPucki, Nature of the Bankrupt Firm, supranote 33, at 664.
86 See generally Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of
OrganizationalLaw, 1 10 YALE L.J. 387 (2000).
87 See Lubben, Realism, supra note 11, at 281-82 (noting a similar flaw in Alan
Schwartz's A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 107 YALE L.J. 1807
(1998)). Many others have noted the frequent exclusion of involuntary creditors from
theoretical models of bankruptcy. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The
Uneasy Casefor the Priorityof Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857, 884
(1996); LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor'sBargain, supra note 43, at 1900; Elizabeth
Warren, TheArticle 9 FullPriorityDebates,82 CORNELLL. REv. 1373,1383 & n.27 (1997).
'3
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or post-bankruptcy, in a normal, large American firm no creditor has
"control rights" in the absolute sense that any of these theorists envision.
Instead, creditors bargain with the firm--or, more precisely, its
management-for degrees of leverage in the negotiations that will follow
the firm's future collapse, if that collapse ever occurs. These negotiations
take place through time, resulting in an ever-changing allocation of control
relative to the financial condition of the firm and the degrees of control that
the firm's managers have already sold to other claimants. Though a
post-bankruptcy lender obviously contracts after much information has
been revealed and is thus in a much better bargaining position, even this
lender's control rights are limited by the powers other parties retain,
including powers given to these parties by the Bankruptcy Code.88
Control rights are thus relative and state-dependent, and the amount of
effort that claimants will expend on obtaining these rights will turn on each
claimant's perception of the debtor's financial condition. For example, if
a pre-bankruptcy creditor that is about to lend a potential debtor $100
currently believes
a) that it will cost $5 to improve the creditor's position in bankruptcy,
b) that the creditor will recover 50% of its claim in bankruptcy without
such protection, and
c) that the potential debtor has a 5% chance of actually filing for
bankruptcy,
the creditor's decision is between $5 in costs now or the present value of
$2.50 in expected bankruptcy losses.89 This creditor will not negotiate for
more protection.
A subsequent creditor facing the same choice when the risks of
bankruptcy are higher or lower, or a creditor with different beliefs about its
likely recovery in bankruptcy, will come to a different conclusion. A
creditor's beliefs about its potential recovery in bankruptcy are, in turn,
driven by what protections other creditors have decided to negotiate for; the
more secured and securitized the creditors, the less potential for recovery
by unsecured creditors and the greater the value of obtaining an ex ante
position improvement.
Even when a claimant may formally obtain a superior position with
respect to the allocation of proceeds upon liquidation, that position will not
represent "a bargained agreement among investors about who should
exercise control over the firm's assets in any particular state of the
" The power to investigate the lender's pre-bankruptcy relationship with the debtor is
one such power. See 11 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (2000) (court must appoint an examiner upon
request if debtor's "unsecured debts, other than debts for goods, services, or taxes, or owing
to an insider, exceed $5,000,000.").
'9The creditor's unpaid claim of $50, discounted by the expected chance of actually
incurring this loss (5%).
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world."9 Instead, that claimant's superior position simply reflects its
superior leverage relative to the other claimants. Nevertheless, each
significant junior claimant still maintains its leverage to influence the
deployment of the debtor's assets by vetoing decisions at the margin; there
is no single "control party" in the sense necessary for control rights
arguments to hold.
The allocation of control rights at the point of financial distress will
thus reflect the end-point of an ongoing, dynamic process. In a firm with
multiple claimants, no one claimant is likely to achieve absolute power to
decide whether or not to liquidate the firm. Instead, claimants will have
varying degrees of leverage which will determine whether or not they have
the power to influence management's choice of a particular course of action
or whether they merely have the power to constrain choices at the margin.
Often several parties will have control rights that are closely matched
in terms of their degree of leverage. Consider, for example, the finance
company that leased refrigeration equipment to a grocery store chain and
the distributor that provided the debtor with its inventory. Although neither
creditor is sufficiently important to the debtor without the other-the
debtor does not need deliveries of frozen foods if it has no refrigeration
cases and vice versa-both creditors have the ability to inflict unilateral
harm on the debtor. This does not change even when the debtor has given
formal post-bankruptcy control to a DIP lender.
Upon the onset of financial distress, the allocation of control rights
between these two creditors is inherently open to contest. The finance
company has the formal control provided by its lease agreement, but the
value of that control may be minimal depending on the market for used
freezers. Even this degree of control may vanish altogether if the supplier
exercises its ability to halt future deliveries to the debtor. The automatic
stay does not compel creditors to continue to trade with the debtor unless
they have contractually bound themselves to do so.9' Though this is perhaps
more likely in the case of the finance company, it is an open question in the
case of the supplier, and in all cases it is subject to the creditor's decision
that it would rather risk the wrath of an angry judge and a suit for damages
than trade with the debtor.92 Throughout, the DIP lender's overriding
9' Baird & Rasmussen, Lessons, supra note 2, at 1805.
9 See generally Donald Wayne, Note, PostbankruptcyRefusalsto Dealwith the Debtor
and the Automatic Stay: A Fresh Approach, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 507 (1994).
9 Because corporate debtors, unlike individuals, cannot recover punitive damages for
breach of the automatic stay, see 11 U.S.C. § 362(h), the decision to attempt to end the

relationship in this context is subject to substantially less risk. Cf Spookyworld, Inc. v.
Town of Berlin (In re Spookyworld, Inc.), 346 F.3d 1, 7-8 (1st Cir. 2003) (following other

appellate courts in holding that a corporation cannot sue under § 362(h) for violations ofthe
automatic stay).
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formal control plays a very small role in the debtor's negotiations with
these key creditors.
In short, control rights are not only relative but also uncertain or
ambiguous. In normal firms, claimants do not come pre-labeled as the
parties "who should exercise control over the firm's assets,"93 and often it
will be impossible to make any such determination. Even when it is
possible to determine that one creditor stands above the others because it
has formal control-a secured lender, for example-other creditors have
enough actual control to prevent unilateral action. In the end, these two
aspects of control, relativity and ambiguity, are fatal to the control rights
theorists' claims that controlling parties have taken over, because these
claims rest on the dubious notion that a single party or group has the
complete power to determine the debtor's fate.
IV. THE SAME OLD STORY?

At first blush, the control rights literature seems to represent a
remarkable turnaround for some of the strongest critics of chapter 11.
94
Baird's early and abundant criticism of chapter 11 is well known,
Rasmussen is the author of a leading article favoring the ability to opt out
of chapter 11 by contract,95 and Skeel, although perhaps more tolerant of
chapter 11 than the others,96 has suggested that corporate bankruptcy should
become part of state (as opposed to federal) corporate law.97 Thus, it may
be surprising to find this group praising bankruptcy judges and the
workings of chapter 11. Has everything changed? Or has nothing changed?
First, it is clear that the control rights model of chapter 11 is in many
ways compatible with the earlier calls to dramatically revamp chapter 11.
These proposals called for a corporate bankruptcy model that would have
replaced chapter I I's collectivism with quick market sales of the debtor
9 Baird & Rasmussen, Lessons, supranote 2, at 1805.
94
See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, BargainingAfterthe Falland the
Contours ofthe Absolute PriorityRule, 55 U. Cm. L. REV. 738 (1988); Douglas G. Baird &
Thomas H. Jackson, FraudulentConveyanceLaw andltsProperDomain, 38 VAND. L. REV.
829 (1985); Baird & Jackson, CorporateReorganizations,supra note 35; Douglas G. Baird
& Thomas H. Jackson, Information, Uncertainty,andthe TransferofProperty, 13 J. LEGAL
STUD. 299 (1984); Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Kovacs and Toxic Wastes in
Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1199 (1984); Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson,
Possessionand Ownership:An Examinationof the Scope ofArticle 9,35 STAN. L. REV. 175
(1983).
9'See Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate
Bankruptcy, 71 TEx. L. REV. 51 (1992).
96 See, e.g., Skeel, Brave New World, supra note 35.
9 See David A. Skeel, Jr., Rethinking the Line Between CorporateLaw and Corporate
Bankruptcy, 72 TEx. L. REV. 471 (1994).

2004-2005]

"NEW AND IMPROVED" CHAPTER 11

followed by cash distributions to creditors.9" The control rights model is
built on a belief that many controlling lenders will exercise their power to
force an early sale of the debtor rather than wait for the negotiation of a
plan. Thus, both models eschew negotiation in favor of sales and, in some
sense, the control rights conception of chapter 11 can be seen as a "second
best" solution, embraced by scholars who find the chapter's collectivism
misguided and inefficient.
In fact, the control rights argument is somewhat more sophisticated: it
argues that developments in the finance markets have overtaken any need
to replace chapter 11 with a market-driven approach. Under Skeel's view
of the control rights model, DIP lenders have become increasingly
sophisticated, deploying not only their loan agreements but also retention
agreements to align managers with the lenders' objectives. The Baird and
Rasmussen model of control rights similarly argues that the kind of choices
about asset deployment that chapter 11 was designed to address are now
preempted by contract.
In short, these one-time critics of chapter 11 now see a chapter 11 that
is entirely different from the one they critiqued in the 1980s and early
1990s. Chapter II has not conformed to their original models, so their
embrace is less than triumphant, but chapter 11 no longer presents the kind
of gnawing intrusion into the free capital markets it once seemed to
represent. Thus, to answer the question "has anything changed," there has
been significant change. But, as so often is the case, the change came more
from the world of practice than the academy.
The proponents ofthe control rights conception of chapter 11 may well
respond that their earlier models are legitimized by all of this, since actual
practice has demonstrated that the old chapter 11 was unacceptable to the
markets. Extrapolating from this, one might even argue for modification of
the current chapter 11 to further enhance and facilitate the exercise of
lender control rights. Of course, this response again assumes that the
normative goal of chapter 11 should be facilitation of senior lender control.
But as I have argued throughout, there is no good reason to think that the
control rights approach is efficient from a societal perspective; it is likely
only efficient from the perspective of the controlling lender.99

9

See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, RevisitingAuctions in Chapter 11, 36 J.L. & EcoN. 633
(1993); Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Casefor Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL
STuD. 127, 139 (1986). The problems that led bankruptcy courts to eschew market
valuations of bankrupt firms in the first place are examined in a classic article by Walter
Blum. See Walter J. Blum, The Law andLanguage ofCorporateReorganization, 17 U. CI-m.
L. REV.565 (1950).

99 Some might also question the use of the market as the relevant criteria in the first
instance, although I leave that argument for others to make.
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CONCLUSION

For more than twenty-five years chapter 11 's critics have been engaged
in the "quixotic task of heralding Chapter I I's inadequacies to a world that
does not seem to be listening."' 0' ° Chapter 11 has withstood these attacks
largely unchanged."'0

Today many of these same critics have embraced chapter 11. In this
article I have explored some of the possible implications of that embraceimplications that should leave the careful scholar (and bankruptcy judge)
to wonder if the new chapter 11 should not be examined with a bit more
care.
The idea of chapter I as a long, slow process directed by a "hands on"
bankruptcy judge, in over his head, was once popular among the critics of
chapter 11, no doubt driven by the arguably aberrant but admittedly
pathetic tale of Eastern Airlines's glacial collapse." 2 Even if this picture of

chapter 11 was once accurate, the control rights story of why it changed,
based on innovations in contracting for controls rights, is unpersuasive.
And if control rights are not absolute, but are instead relative and often
ambiguous, claimants need a forum to resolve their competing claims and
agree on a plan for redeploying the firm's assets. Chapter 11 currently
provides such a forum.

'00Lubben, Realism, supra note 11, at 270.
'0' See Kevin A. Kordana & Eric A. Posner, A Positive Theory of Chapter 11, 74

N.Y.U. L. REv. 161, 163 (1999) ("The current system has been in place for twenty years and,
despite much dissatisfaction, has so far been resistant to reform.").
10 See Lubben, The Direct Costs of CorporateReorganization,supra note 50, at 543

(crediting Professor Rasmussen with popularizing the story of Eastern's demise as the
archetypal chapter 11 case); see also Lawrence A. Weiss & Karen H. Wruck, Information
Problems, Conflicts of Interest, and Asset Stripping:Chapter II's Failurein the Case of
Eastern Airlines, 48 J. FIN. ECON. 55 (1998).

